Brio, Verve and Zap? The Improbability of a Trade Agreement with Peru by de Ruyter, A. & Hearne, D.
   
1 
 
Brio, Verve and Zap?  The Improbability of a Trade 
Agreement with Peru 
By Professor Alex de Ruyter and David Hearne, Centre for Brexit Studies 
23rd May 2018 
By Professor Alex de Ruyter and David Hearne, Centre for Brexit Studies 
The Foreign Secretary’s visit to Latin America has attracted a great deal of media attention, much of 
which has been focussed on calls for a “Brexit plane” labelled a “Jumbojo-jet” by some in the media 
[1].  This follows his criticism of the lack of availability of the existing Voyager aircraft and its colour 
[2] – presumably because the latter fails to exude sufficient brio and verve.  Nevertheless, the 
substantive issue remains a desire to substantially grow British trade with the region post-Brexit [3]. 
The mechanics of precisely how Brexit is likely to facilitate this remains unclear.  After all, of the 
three countries that his five-day tour encompasses, the EU already enjoys a free trade agreement 
(FTA) with two of them (Chile and Peru – although in the latter case the agreement is currently in the 
process of being applied).  The agreement with Peru also encompasses Colombia and Ecuador, 
although the latter only joined in 2017 (and in all cases is currently provisionally applied).  This leaves 
Mercosur and the “economic powerhouses” of Venezuela and Bolivia as major “Brexit targets” with 
which the UK might seek to grow trade. 
The EU is in active negotiations with Mercosur (the trade bloc that encompasses much of the 
remainder of the continent, including Brazil, Argentina Uruguay and Paraguay) to strike a 
preferential trade agreement.  In spite of criticisms that the EU lacks the dynamism that post-Brexit 
Britain needs, its present agenda in terms of negotiating trade partnerships is relatively 
ambitious.  Indeed, one of the ironies of recent developments is that just as the Foreign Secretary’s 
attentions are focussed on Latin America, the EU is pursuing a trade agreement with some of 
Britain’s most important Commonwealth trade partners. 
It is therefore not unlikely that, post-Brexit, trade barriers could be higher between Australia and 
Britain than between Australia and the EU [4].  Given the importance ascribed to potential trade 
with the UK’s Commonwealth partners by some in the Cabinet [5] this is indeed ironic, particularly 
given the (possibly insurmountable) obstacles in the way of FTAs with other members of the 
Commonwealth, including India and Nigeria (ibid.) 
A further problem is the absence of diagonal cumulation in almost all trade agreements.  At present, 
many of the goods that the UK specialises in exporting (for example cars and automotive products) 
would have tariffs levied on them even if an FTA were signed.  This is because of so-called “rules of 
origin” criteria.  In most FTAs, there is a stipulation that the exporter prove that at least 55% 
(although sometimes as low as 50%) of the value of the goods exported is from the country in 
question. 
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The UK’s automotive industry, however, is highly integrated with its counterparts across the EU – 
many of the components in British cars are produced in France or Germany (just as many 
components in French and German cars are produced in the UK).  As a result, an insufficient 
proportion of the total value of the car is produced in the UK for it to be exported duty-free.  At 
present, this doesn’t matter – trade deals are signed with the EU and not any individual country and 
so, providing a sufficient proportion of the value comes from the EU as a whole, British cars can be 
imported duty-free. 
This is likely to be a major problem for the post-Brexit “Brave New World” envisaged by the Foreign 
Secretary and the Secretary of State for International Trade: any new trade deals would need to 
allow so-called “diagonal cumulation” with the EU.  In order to do so, the country in question would 
almost certainly need to have signed a trade deal with the EU as well, which rather negates the 
benefits of the swashbuckling approach that the Foreign Secretary appears to favour. 
Whilst there might be a desire to develop deeper and more comprehensive agreements than those 
the UK presently enjoys as a result of its membership of the EU, it is difficult to see how these are 
likely to be achieved in practice.  Most non-tariff trade barriers today take the form of regulatory 
differences between standards and the physical difficulties and costs associated with customs 
clearance and transport (although there are many examples of other, more pernicious, deliberate 
barriers such as quotas). 
The UK has managed to eliminate customs barriers with the EU by dint of sharing the same (or at 
least equivalent) regulatory standards and tariffs vis-à-vis the outside world (the latter being a 
product of the EU Customs Union).  It is difficult to see how any trade agreement with Peru could 
replicate this without making trade with other (far larger) trade partners much more 
difficult.  Furthermore, geography is a crucial factor in limiting the impact of comprehensive 
economic and trade agreements (however comprehensive they might be) relative to EU 
membership, irrespective of the zap and ardour with which they might be pursued by the Foreign 
Secretary and others. 
In particular, at present it is possible for goods produced in the Black Country to be loaded onto a 
lorry and driven to a client in Spain (or Slovakia, for that matter).  An entire system is in place to 
facilitate this.  The EU Customs Union obviates the need for customs checks at Calais, whilst 
membership of the European Economic Area means that standards are the same (and hence the 
goods don’t need to be checked to ensure that they meet Spanish (or Slovakian) regulations.  There 
is no need to change vehicle or driver (saving further time at the border) because of the existence of 
the Community License, which permits drivers to use a single permit for travel throughout the EU 
(and can be granted free of charge to any haulier in possession of the Standard International 
Operators License necessary to operate in the UK).  Naturally, this is linked to freedom of movement 
of labour. 
Even if such an agreement were possible with Peru, it would have vastly less impact.  Firstly, the 
minor matter of an ocean voyage would require a vehicle change.  Unlike cross-channel ferries, 
modern container ships do not typically carry HGVs across the Atlantic.  The financial impact of 
taking a vehicle off the road for several days whilst it crosses the ocean differs by several orders of 
magnitude from taking it on a 2-hour ferry crossing.  Similarly, in order to avoid customs checks, the 
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UK would need to ensure that goods from the UK were shipped in sealed containers (to avoid 
smuggling).  These would still need to be unpacked and loaded onto HGVs upon arrival.  A 2 hour 
delay at customs makes a big difference to a journey of 18 hours and might be critical for a firm 
shipping just-in-time components from Birmingham to Bavaria.  The same 2 hour delay is unlikely to 
be such an issue in the context of a 28-day voyage to Peru. 
Moreover, any move towards regulatory alignment with other trading partners would move the UK 
away from the regulatory orbit of the EU.  In practical terms, this is likely to increase trade frictions 
with a trade partner that accounts for well over 40% of total UK trade, in the hope of greater 
alignment with trade partners that account for a fraction of this amount. 
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